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I. MINERAL OWNERSHIP 
A. The Ohio Marketable Title Act 
Ohio courts continue applying the Ohio Marketable Title Act to 
severed oil and gas rights.1 As with many statutes, there are generally 
two questions that must be answered: (1) does the particular statute 
apply to the particular facts of the case and (2) if the statute applies in 
the first instance, how does a court apply the statute to the particular 
facts of the case? Both questions about Ohio’s Marketable Title Act 





†Attorneys at the law firm of Krugliak, Wilkins, Griffiths & Dougherty Co., L.P.A 
 1. Senterra Ltd. v. Winland, 148 N.E.3d 34, 39–41 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019), 
modified on reconsideration, No. 18 BE 0051, 2019 WL 7670234 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2019), appeal granted, 145 N.E.3d 311 (Ohio 2020). 
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1. Does the Ohio Marketable Title Act apply to severed minerals, 
generally? 
In West v. Bode, the Ohio Supreme Court accepted a discretionary 
appeal on the specific issue of whether the Ohio Marketable Title Act 
applies to severed mineral rights or whether the enactment of the Ohio 
Dormant Mineral Act (R.C. 5301.56) precluded its application.2 On 
December 3, 2020, the Ohio Supreme Court finally answered this 
question in the affirmative.3  
The Ohio Supreme Court held that the Ohio Marketable Title still 
applies to severed mineral interests.4 The Court determined that (1) 
there was not an “irreconcilable conflict between the Dormant Mineral 
Act and the Marketable Title Act”5, (2) that the Ohio General 
Assembly intended for both statutes to apply to severed mineral 
interests6, and (3) the statutes provide “independent, alternative 
statutory mechanisms that may be used to reunite severed mineral 
interests with the surface property subject to those interests.”7  
As to the claim there was a conflict between the statutes because the 
statutes have different mechanisms, the Court saw no problem with 
applying both statutes independent of one another: “[b]ut the fact that 
the two acts operate differently, toward different ends, does not mean 
that they are irreconcilably in conflict. Indeed, it suggests the 
contrary.”8  
Based on the West decision, surface owners may use both statutes, 
“either of which may be used to effect the termination of a severed 
mineral interest, depending on the circumstances of the case and the 
time that has elapsed.”9 
On December 29, 2020, the Ohio Supreme Court denied the mineral 
owners’ motion for reconsideration in West, thereby solidifying its 
present precedential value.10 
The Fifth and Seventh District Court of Appeals had, on several 
occasions, confronted the question posed in West. From 2019 to 2020, 
like in previous years, these courts continued to hold that the 
Marketable Title Act does indeed apply to severed minerals, in 
 
 2. West v. Bode, 137 N.E.3d 1190, 1196 (Ohio 2019). 
 3. West v. Bode, No. 2019-1494, 2020 WL 7049820, ¶ 11(Ohio 2020). 
 4. Id. ¶¶ 1-2. 
 5. Id. ¶¶ 2, 27-42. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. ¶ 59. 
 8. Id. ¶ 29. 
 9. Id. ¶ 44. 
 10. West v. Bode, 159 N.E.3d 1168 (Ohio 2019). 
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conjunction with and parallel to the Ohio Dormant Mineral Act.11 
Ohioans and legal practitioners now have the Ohio Supreme Court’s 
say on this matter. 
2. How does the Ohio Marketable Title Act apply to the particular 
severed mineral at issue in each case? 
Moving past the threshold question of whether to apply the 
Marketable Title Act to severed mineral interests, Ohio courts 
continue to examine and refine how the particular provisions of the 
statute apply to certain mineral interests or certain fact patterns. 
In Senterra Ltd. v. Winland, the Seventh District Court of Appeals 
held that: (1) a surface owner was not precluded from using the 
Marketable Title Act to extinguish a mineral interest after the surface 
owner attempted an abandonment under the Dormant Mineral Act and 
(2) actions by the surface owner or mineral interest holder under the 
Dormant Mineral Act would not revive an interest already 
extinguished by the Marketable Title Act.  
The case raised three important issues. First, the court held the 
Marketable Title Act applies to severed mineral rights.12 Second, the 
court held that a landowner is permitted to use the Marketable Title 
Act to extinguish mineral interests when the landowner had already 
attempted to use the Dormant Mineral Act to abandon the same 
interest allowed, noting that a landowner can raise alternative theories 
of recovery in a case.13 Further, under Ohio Revised Code section 
5301.51, if a mineral interest has already been extinguished under the 
Marketable Title Act, it cannot be revived. Therefore, it is unclear how 
an action by the surface owner (whether under the Dormant Mineral 
Act or not) could somehow revive an already extinguished interest.  
Third, how do you determine the forty-year look back period under 
the MTA? Ohio Revised Code section 5301.48 indicates that a person 
has record marketable title if he or she has an unbroken chain of title 
 
 11. See Peppertree Farms, L.L.C., v. Thonen, No. 2019CA00159, 2020 WL 
2563411, at *9 (Ohio Ct. App. May 19, 2020); Peppertree Farms, L.L.C. v. Thonen, 
No. 2019CA00161, 2020 WL 2563417, at *8 (Ohio Ct. App. May 19, 2020); 
Erickson, 151 N.E.3d at 116; Cain v. Horn, No. 19CA000031, 2020 WL 2989117, 
at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. May 11, 2020), appeal granted, 151 N.E.3d 634 (Ohio 2020); 
Miller v. Mellott, 130 N.E.3d 1021, 1026 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019), appeal granted, 138 
N.E.3d 1163 (Ohio 2020). 
 12. Senterra Ltd. v. Winland, 148 N.E.3d 34, 39–41 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019), 
modified on reconsideration, No. 18 BE 0051, 2019 WL 7670234 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2019), appeal granted, 145 N.E.3d 311 (Ohio 2020). 
 13. Id. at 40. 
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for forty years or more with nothing in the record purporting to divest 
the person of the interest. Record marketable title extinguished 
interests and claims existing prior to the effective date of the root of 
title.14 “Root of title” is defined as:  
 
[t]hat conveyance or other title transaction in the chain 
of title of a person, purporting to create the interest 
claimed by the person, upon which he relies as a basis 
for the marketability of his title, and which was the 
most recent to be recorded as of a date forty years prior 
to the time when marketability is being determined.15 
 
The court found that a root of title has two elements; one is temporal, 
and one is substantive.16 The root of title cannot be the initial 
severance deed of the interest the person is seeking to extinguish, but 
it can contain a repetition of a reservation. To determine the root of 
title, one must find a deed at least forty years prior to the time 
marketability is being determined and then examine the recordings in 
the forty years succeeding that title transaction to see if there is 
anything in the record purporting to divest the person of the claimed 
interest.17 If there is, then that deed does not qualify as the root of title, 
and the next preceding deed must be examined. A title examiner 
continues moving back in time until he or she finds a conveyance 
followed by forty years of clean title. That document is the root, and 
the examiner can safely conclude that the act extinguished all 
competing interests recorded prior to that date. 
Once the examiner finds a forty-year period where there is no 
preserving act, it is important to understand that no act occurring after 
the forty-year period can revive the extinguished interest. Therefore, 
while there were leases executed by the mineral holders in 2016 and 
2017, those leases would not revive the interest if it was already 
extinguished. The court found that there were no preservation acts 
within the applicable forty-year periods (1954–1994 for one 
reservation and 1971–2011 as to other reservations), and therefore 
they were extinguished.18 
 
 14. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.47(A) (West 2018). 
 15. Id. § 53047(E). 
 16. Senterra, 148 N.E.3d at 42.7 
 17. Id. at 42–43. 
 18. See id. at 48–49. 
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In Richmond Mills, Inc. v. Ferraro, the Seventh District Court of 
Appeals, in addition to deciding that the Marketable Title Act applies 
to severed mineral interests, interpreted Ohio Revised Code section 
5301.51(B). That portion of the Ohio Revised Code provides a method 
for preserving any possessory interest under the MTA: 
 
If the same record owner of any possessory interest in 
land has been in possession of the land continuously 
for a period of forty years or more, during which period 
no title transaction with respect to such interest appears 
of record in his chain of title, and no notice has been 
filed by him on his behalf as provided in division (A) 
of this section, and such possession continues to the 
time when marketability is being determined, the 
period of possession is equivalent to the filing of the 
notice immediately preceding the termination of the 
forty-year period described in division (A) of this 
section.19 
 
The physical possession, preserving event under the Marketable Title 
Act applies to all possessory interests affecting real property, not just 
severed oil and gas rights. The Seventh District interpreted this statute 
in a more expansive manner by holding there is no need for the 
possessory interest owner to physically possess the land. Instead, the 
court opted for a definition of possession that only requires the owner 
to still be alive when marketability is determined.20 Under such an 
interpretation, all record owners of a pre-root interest would be 
presumed to be in constructive possession merely by being a record 
owner. 
B. The Ohio Dormant Mineral Act 
1. How extensive of a search for mineral holders must a surface 
owner undertake before publishing notice of intent to abandon 
severed minerals? 
In Gerrity v. Chervenak,21 the Ohio Supreme Court addressed the 
reach of the notice requirements the Dormant Mineral Act imposes as 
 
 19. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.51(B) (West 2018). 
 20. Richmond Mills, Inc. v. Ferraro, No. 18 JE 0015, 2019 WL 6974458, *8 
(Ohio Ct. App. 2019), appeal granted, 148 N.E.3d 595 (Ohio 2020). 
 21. No. 2019-1123 (Ohio 2020).  
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prerequisites to deeming a severed mineral interest abandoned and 
vested in the owner of the surface of the land subject to the severed 
mineral interest.  
In Gerrity, the minerals to Guernsey County property were severed 
in a 1961 deed.22  A title search revealed the mineral rights were 
conveyed to Jane F. Richards by a certificate of transfer filed with the 
Guernsey County Recorder in 1965.23  The certificate of transfer lists 
a Cleveland, Ohio address for Richards.24  “The Chervenak chain of 
title contained no other records regarding ownership of the severed 
mineral interest.”25  
Before a severed mineral interest becomes vested in the owner of 
the surface, the Dormant Mineral Act provides the surface owner shall 
“[s]erve notice by certified mail, return receipt requested, to each 
holder or each holder’s successors or assignees, at the last known 
address of each, of the owner’s intent to declare the mineral interest 
abandoned.26  If service of notice cannot be completed to any holder, 
the owner shall publish notice of the owner’s intent to declare the 
mineral interest abandoned[.]”27 
The Dormant Mineral Act broadly defines holder to include the 
record holder, and any person who derives the person’s rights from the 
record holder.28 The Supreme Court found that a surface owner does 
not need to specifically identify by name every holder, because when 
the identity of a holder cannot be identified, publication is expressly 
permitted when service cannot be completed by certified mail – which 
is plainly the case when a holder cannot be identified.29  
The Supreme Court noted the Dormant Mineral Act was enacted to 
“address the difficulty (and sometimes impossibility) of identifying 
the owners of severed mineral interests and to encourage reliance on 
record chains of title.”30 Requiring endless searching is not the 
intended consequence of the statute because “[n]o matter the effort 
expended, a surface owner can never be certain that he has identified 
every successor and assignee of every holder who appears in the public 
 
 22. Id. ¶ 2. 
 23. Id. ¶ 3. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.56(E) (West 2021) 
 27. Id. 
 28. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.56(A)(1) (West 2021).   
 29. Gerrity, No. 2019-1123, ¶ 17. 
 30. Id. ¶ 20. 
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record.”31 Indeed, the Supreme Court held that the legislature did not 
intend service by certified mail to be mandatory, nor does it mandate 
an attempt at service by certified mail “when it is apparent that such 
service cannot be completed.”32 
The Supreme Court rejected Gerrity’s attempt to incorporate the 
service requirements under Civil Rule 4.4, which requires an affidavit 
of all efforts to locate a party to be served with notice of a lawsuit 
before service by publication can be granted by a court order.33 
The Supreme Court also rejected Gerrity’s argument that a 
reasonable search should include the internet: 
 
The ever-changing quantum and quality of information 
available on the Internet, the inconsistent reliability of 
that information, and the variability of Internet-search 
results all weigh against a bright-line requirement for 
online searches, let alone a bright-line requirement that 
a surface owner consult any particular paid 
subscription services, to identify heirs to a severed 
mineral interest.34 
 
Whether a party has exercised reasonable diligence will depend on 
the facts and circumstances of each case.35 Thus, no bright line test 
exists. However, the Supreme Court provided guidance on the test. A 
surface owner must start by searching the chain of title to the property 
at interest as a starting point.36  “In addition to property records in the 
county in which the land that is subject to the mineral interest is 
located, a reasonable search for holders of a severed mineral interest 
will generally also include a search of court records, including probate 
records, in that county.”37 Whether any further searching will be 
necessary will depend on the results of the county search or the surface 
owner’s independent knowledge.38  Assuming those searches do not 
reveal any additional information (including that the holder has died, 
 
 31. Id. ¶ 21. 
 32. Id. ¶ 24. 
 33. Id. ¶ 27 (“The General Assembly has not incorporated the requirements of 
Civ.R. 4.4 or R.C. 2703.24—or any similar requirements—into the Dormant 
Mineral Act as prerequisites for using notice by publication, and this court may not 
do so by judicial fiat.”). 
 34. Id. ¶ 34. 
 35. Id. ¶ 31. 
 36. Id. ¶ 35. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. ¶ 36. 
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transferred the interest, or has a more recent address), it appears no 
further search is necessary, and the surface owner can proceed to send 
notice, including by publication (which the Court held raises no due-
process concerns). 
In Fonzi v. Brown, the Seventh District Court of Appeals examined 
what level of research is needed, specifically looking at whether a 
surface owner must look at counties outside where the real property at 
issue is located. The court stated, “[w]e again decline to establish a 
bright-line rule requiring a specific search process and reaffirm that 
what constitutes reasonable due diligence will depend on the facts and 
circumstances of each case.”39 Thus, Fonzi does not require any 
specific type of search. Instead, the decision reinforces the need to 
look at each case on its unique facts. 
Additionally, in Fonzi, the title researcher had specific knowledge 
the reserving party lived in Washington County, Pennsylvania, as the 
“reservation deed expressly stated that this is where the Fonzis 
lived.”40 The title researcher “conceded that he learned this fact early 
in his search process.”41 It was “[t]his fact alone that would have led 
any reasonable researcher to extend the search into Washington 
County, Pennsylvania.”42 Therefore, the Seventh District held that the 
surface owner “had specific knowledge” that the mineral owners or 
their families lived in a different county and state than the subject 
property.43 The surface owner’s “failure to conduct any search into the 
Washington County public records after learning that this is where the 
Fonzis resided” was “per se unreasonable based on the facts of this 
case.”44 The outcome in Fonzi, that the search was unreasonable, 
turned on one fact—the surface owner had actual knowledge of where 
the reserving parties lived and did not check there. 
In Hutchins v. Baker, the Seventh District Court of Appeals decided 
whether an affidavit of fact relating to how a holder allegedly acquired 
her interest in the minerals was a title transaction, meaning a 
preserving event under the Ohio Dormant Mineral Act.45 The affidavit 
at issue discussed three alleged title transactions from which the holder 
 
 39. Fonzi v. Brown, No.19 MO 0012, 2020 WL 3639886, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. 
June 1, 2020). 
 40. Id.  
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at *6.  
 44. Id. 
 45. Hutchins v. Baker, No. 19 MO 0005, 2020 WL 1488726, at *3–*4 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Feb. 26, 2020). ) 
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claimed her title to the minerals.46 It also described “each death and 
passing of the interest was a title transaction regarding the mineral 
interest.”47 The affidavit described “family history and heirship” but 
did not actually claim to convey the interest from one party to another 
party (the appellant).48 
The term “title transaction” is not defined within Ohio Revised 
Code section 5301.56; however, it has been interpreted to have the 
same meaning as defined in the Ohio Marketable Title Act.49 A title 
transaction is “any transaction affecting title to any interest in land, 
including title by will or descent, title by tax deed, or by trustee’s, 
assignee’s, guardian’s, executor’s, administrator’s, or sheriff’s deed, 
or decree of any court, as well as warranty deed, quit claim deed, or 
mortgage.”50  
Although the affidavit at issue in Hutchins described “how title was 
received,” it was “not a transaction.”51 And descriptions “of prior title 
transactions” are not, in and of themselves, title transactions.52 The 
Hutchins court held the affidavit was not a title transaction and then 
separately analyzed whether it qualified as a “claim to preserve,” as 
the term is used in the Dormant Mineral Act.53 The court ultimately 
decided it was not a valid claim to preserve because it did not contain: 
(1) the mineral holder’s address; (2) the names of the record owner of 
the lands covered by the affidavit (meaning the surface owners); (3) 
the recording information for the surface owners’ acquisition 
instruments; and (4) the recording information for the instrument from 
where the property description came.54 The court held this affidavit 
neither strictly nor substantially complied with the statute’s 
requirements, which somewhat contradicts a previous decision from 
the same court.55 Thus, it appears the court failed to set any bright-line 
test on what is sufficient to be a claim to preserve. 
 
 46. Id. at *3. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Dodd v. Croskey, 37 N.E.3d 147, 154 (Ohio 2015).3 
 50. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.47(F) (West 2018). 
 51. Hutchins, 2020 WL 1488726 at *4. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at *4. 
 55. Compare id. with Paul v. Hannon, No. 15 CA 0908, 2017 WL 1231743 at *1 
(Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2017).. 
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C. Words of Inheritance and Life Estates 
Real property estates conveyed or reserved prior to March 25, 1925, 
needed to have words of inheritance, such as “to [grantor], heirs, and 
assigns forever,” otherwise it conveyed or reserved merely a life 
estate.56 On March 25, 1925, Ohio General Code section 8510-1 went 
into effect, which removed the requirement of words of inheritance. 
In Headley v. Ackerman, the Seventh District Court of Appeals 
Court held no words of inheritance were required to extend a royalty 
reservation past a life estate if the interest in the conveyance or 
reservation was already in existence.57 Essentially, if the reserving 
party intended to reserve and at the same time create a new property 
interest, meaning one unique to that which was previous owned, then 
words of inheritance were needed. Otherwise, no such words were 
needed. 
In Peppertree Farms, LLC v. Thonen, the Fifth District Court of 
Appeals held that the following pre-1925 mineral reservations had to 
have words of inheritance or they were merely life estates: “is hereby 
reserved and is not made part of this transfer” and “excepts and 
reserves one-half of the royalty of the oil and gas under the described 
real estate.”58 The court relied on the fact that each of these 
reservations indicated “the grantors were reserving interests unto 
themselves, not merely excepting them from the grant.”59 Thus, 
whether to apply the rule to a particular mineral reservation will be 
fact-sensitive, focusing upon the original parties’ intent. 
II. MINERAL EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION 
A. Oil and Gas Lease Issues 
1. Lease Royalty Issues 
As the development of Ohio’s shale moved away from leasing and 
mineral acquisition and into production of the minerals, there have 
been significantly more lawsuits about the calculation of landowners’ 
 
 56. Roberts v. Jones, 91 N.E.2d 817, 818 (Ohio Ct. App. 1949); see also Gill v. 
Fletcher, 78 N.E. 433 (Ohio 1906); Embleton v. McMechen, 143 N.E. 177 (Ohio 
1924). 
 57. Headley v. Ackerman, No. 16 MO 0010, 2017 WL 4351411 at *6 (Sept. 22, 
2017). 
 58. Peppertree Farms, L.L.C., v. Thonen, No. 2019CA00159, 2020 WL 
2563411, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. May 19, 2020). 
 59. Id. 
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lease royalties. Landowners throughout Ohio have brought claims 
alleging the producers wrongfully calculated their royalties under the 
operative oil and gas leases. 
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, 
operating with diversity jurisdiction, decided two cases involving the 
same oil and gas lease (meaning the royalty provisions were identical 
in the cases). In Bounty Minerals, LLC v. Chesapeake Exploration, 
LLC and Zehentbauer Family Land LP v. Chesapeake Exploration, 
LLC, the court decided whether the producer was permitted to assess 
post-production costs against the landowner’s gas royalty under the 
following royalty provision:  
 
To pay to the Lessor seventeen and one-half percent [] 
royalty based upon the gross proceeds paid to Lessee 
for the gas marketed and used off the leased premises, 
including casinghead gas or other gaseous substance, 
and produced from each well drilled thereon, computed 
at the wellhead from the sale of such gas substances so 
sold by Lessee in an arm’s-length transaction to an 
unaffiliated bona fide purchaser, or if the sale is to an 
affiliate of Lessee, the price upon which royalties are 
based shall be comparable to that which could be 
obtained in an arm’s-length transaction (given the 
quantity and quality of the gas available for sale from 
the leased premises and for a similar contract term) and 
without any deductions or expenses except for Lessee 
to deduct from Lessor’s royalty payments Lessor’s 
prorated share of any tax, severance or otherwise, 
imposed by any government body. For purposes of this 
Lease, “gross proceeds” means the total consideration 
paid for oil, gas, associated hydrocarbons, and 




 60. Bounty Minerals, LLC v. Chesapeake Expl., LLC, No. 5:17cv1695, 2019 
WL 7171353, at *9–10 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 23, 2019); see also Zehentbauer Family 
Land, LP v. Chesapeake Expl., L.L.C., 934 F.3d 496 (6th Cir. 2019) (noting that the 
oil and gas leases in these cases contained different gas royalty percentages, but 
contained identical language as to how to calculate the royalties, meaning with or 
without post-production cost deductions). 
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In Bounty, the district court determined that post-production costs 
could be assessed against the landowner’s royalties, relying on the 
single phrase “computed at the wellhead.”61 Initially, the district court 
held that the phrase “computed at the wellhead” applied to both sales 
to unaffiliated third parties and sales to affiliates.62 Then, the district 
court went on to say that the point of valuation for gas royalties under 
this lease form was “at the wellhead,” meaning the lease prohibits only 
deductions for production costs.63 And Bounty ultimately lost its 
claims against Chesapeake in this case because: (1) Bounty did not 
dispute that the affiliate transaction between Chesapeake Exploration 
and Chesapeake Marketing was an actual sale and (2) the district court 
found Bounty’s royalties were calculated based on that transaction, 
meaning calculated at the wellhead.64 
In Zehentbauer Family Land, the district court followed the Bounty 
court’s ruling. Zehentbauer was a class action, wherein the class 
included all those lessors with the lease in Bounty and who had been 
receiving royalties or were entitled to receive royalties.65 The district 
court agreed with the Bounty court’s determination that the lessors’ 
royalties should be computed at the wellhead, meaning post-
production costs were permitted between the wellhead and the point 
of actual sale upon which the initial sales price was taken.66 In doing 
so, the district court essentially held that the gross proceeds language 
prevented only those post-production costs incurred prior to the 
 
 61. Bounty Minerals, LLC, 2019 WL 7171353 at *10–12. 
 62. Id. at *28 (quoting that “Indeed, as counsel for Bounty Minerals repeatedly 
explained during oral argument, it is Bounty Minerals’ position that this Court 
should entirely ignore the second clause of the gas royalty provision when applying 
the third clause, rendering the “at the wellhead” language irrelevant. It is well-
established, however, that a contract should be construed to give effect to all of its 
provisions”). 
 63. Id. at *29. 
 64. Id. at 33 (quoting that “Notably, Bounty Minerals does not dispute that (1) 
Chesapeake Exploration’s transfer of the hydrocarbons to CEM constitutes a ‘sale 
to an affiliate’ under the Lease; or (2) Defendants calculated the value of the 
hydrocarbons ‘at the wellhead.’ Therefore, the Court finds that Bounty Minerals has 
failed to demonstrate that Defendants breached the gas royalty provisions of the 
relevant leases)”. 
 65. Zehentbauer Family Land LP v. Chesapeake Expl., LLC, 450 F. Supp. 3d 
790, 811 (N.D. Ohio), appeal filed, No. 20-3469 (6th Cir. May 1, 2020). 
 66. Id. at 809 (“The Court finds the Lease language in the case at bar, ‘without 
any deductions or expenses’ means CELLC and TEPUSA may not deduct the post-
production costs they pay prior to the sale to CEMLLC or TGPNA. Thus, CELLC 
and TEPUSA follow the ‘without any deductions or expenses’ Lease language by 
taking no deductions for their post-production costs from the price they receive from 
the affiliate sales to CEMLLC or TGPNA.”). 
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wellhead, thus adopting the netback method for calculating royalties.67 
That Chesapeake Exploration was transacting with its marketing 
affiliate did not change the district court’s analysis on this subject.68 
In Gateway Royalty, L.L.C. v. Chesapeake Exploration, Ohio state 
courts Carroll County and the Seventh District Court of Appeals 
decided whether Chesapeake could deduct post-production costs 
under the following royalty provision:  
 
as royalty for the gas marketed and used off the 
premises and produced from each well drilled thereon, 
the sum of one-eighth [] of such gas so marketed and 
used at the price paid to [the] [l]essee . . . less any 
charges for transportation, compression and/or 
dehydration to deliver the gas for sale.69  
 
The appellate court concluded that post-production deductions were 
permitted because: (1) Chesapeake produced and marketed the gas 
through production efforts; (2) Chesapeake sold the production to its 
marketing affiliate “at or near the wellhead”; (3) the Chesapeake 
marketing affiliate then calculated the netback “price by taking the 
proceeds it receive[d] from third-party buyers downstream and 
deducting the transportation, compression, gathering, and other 
post-production costs it incurs”; and (4) the marketing company then 
“pa[id] the Chesapeake defendants the ‘netback’ price for the gas and 
NGLs produced and sold at the wellhead.”70  
An interesting event occurred in proximity to the above-discussed 
royalty cases—Chesapeake Energy Corporation and numerous 
affiliated companies filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protections on 
June 29, 2020.71 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 810 (“The objective standard set forth in the plain language of the Gross 
Royalty Leases is that the price on which royalties are based shall be comparable to 
that which could be obtained in an arms length sale. Therefore, if CEMLLC pays 
CELLC or TGPNA pays TEPUSA a price that is greater than what could be obtained 
in an arms length sale, CELLC/TEPUSA may pay a royalty based on the lower price 
a non-affiliated buyer would pay for the same gas.”). 
 69. Gateway Royalty, L.L.C. v. Chesapeake Expl., No. 19 CA 0933, 2020 WL 
1671626, at ¶ 3 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2020), reh’g denied sub nom. Gateway 
Royalty, L.L.C. v. Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C., 2020 WL 3604278 (Ohio Ct. 
App. June 24, 2020). 
 70. Id. at *4. 
 71. Matthew DiLallo, Chesapeake Energy Files for Bankruptcy, THE MOTLEY 
FOOL (June 29, 2020, 8:58 AM), 
https://www.fool.com/investing/2020/06/29/chesapeake-energy-files-for-
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In Board of Education Toronto City Schools v. American Energy 
Utica, LLC, an Ohio appellate court decided whether the lessor could 
include American Energy Utica (the ultimately lessee and producer) 
as a known principal when the oil and gas leasing documents listed 
only American Energy Utica’s agent.72 The court held that the lessor 
could do just that because American Energy had authorized the agent 
to enter into the contract.73 
2. Statute of Limitations on Lease Expiration Claims 
In Browne v. Artex Oil Co., the Ohio Supreme Court held that a 
cause of action alleging an oil and gas lease expired or terminated by 
its own terms must be brought within twenty-one years of when the 
cause of action accrues, which is the statute of limitations for quiet 
title actions in Ohio.74 In doing so, the Court rejected the argument 
that lease termination or expiration claims are based on breaches of 
contract.75 The court declined to answer when the cause of action 
actually accrues, leaving that to future cases.76 
3. Paying Quantities Under Oil and Gas Leases 
Several Ohio cases have examined whether oil and gas leases 
continue to be held by production in paying quantities. In Talbott v. 
Condevco, Inc., the Ohio appellate court made several holdings 
relating to lease expiration: (1) unless an oil and gas lease requires the 
lessee to comply with state reporting requirements, such as change of 
ownership forms for oil and gas wells, in order to perpetuate the lease, 
then the lessee’s failure to comply does not terminate the lease;77 (2) 
a lessee need not account for the fair market rental value of a swab rig 
if the lessee owns their own swab rig and no charges are assessed to 
 
bankruptcy.aspx [https://perma.cc/CZ4Z-XYJX]. 
 72. Bd. of Educ. Toronto City Sch. v. Am. Energy Utica, LLC, 152 N.E.3d 378 
(Ohio Ct. App.), appeal denied sub nom. Toronto City Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. Am. 
Energy Utica, L.L.C., 146 N.E.3d 586 (Ohio 2020). 
 73. Id. at 390. 
 74. Browne v. Artex Oil Co., 144 N.E.3d 378, 389 (Ohio 2019) (“We agree with 
the Fourth District’s holding in Rudolph that an action to recognize the reversion of 
mineral interests following the alleged termination of an oil and gas lease pursuant 
to its express terms is not an action upon a written contract; it is more akin to a quiet-
title action.”). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 390. 
 77. Talbott v. Condevco, Inc., No. 19 MO 0007, 2020 WL 2781729, at *7 (Ohio 
Ct. App. May 4, 2020).5 
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the lessee for the swab rig’s use;78 (3) the hours and wages for the 
lessee’s employees who are paid to conduct the swabbing should be 
counted as an operating expense, meaning the payment counts as an 
expense in determining paying quantities profit;79 and (4) the 
employees’ labor rate need not be set at the fair market labor rate for 
workers outside the lessee for purposes of paying quantities analysis.80 
In Tewanger v. Stonebridge Operating Co., the appellate court: (1) 
assumed a paying-quantities claim accrual date of when production 
under the lease began (which is somewhat confusing considering lease 
termination cannot, by their nature, accrue until the production 
ceases);81 and (2) held that the lease terminated because the lessee 
conceded a lack of production for six consecutive years.82 
In Fiocca v. AIM Energy, LLC, the appellate court held that a lessee 
may pool common meter or common tank production from multiple 
wells located on the same leasehold or leaseholds.83 In Fiocca, the 
lessee drilled four wells on the same leasehold and pooled their 
production volumes.84 The production from those wells was not 
commingled with production from other wells located on other 
leaseholds, thus there were no concerns about lack of production on 
the leasehold at issue.85 The lease at issue did not require that each 
well drilled under the lease separately produce in paying quantities, 
thus there was no issue with commingling the wells’ production. 
In Head v. Victor McKenzie Drilling, Inc., the appellate court 
affirmed its prior precedent, holding that Ohio courts have no 
authority to order an oil and gas well be plugged.86 Only the Chief of 
the Ohio Department of Natural Resources has the authority to order 
wells be plugged.87 
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 79. Id. at *14. 
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 81. Tewanger v. Stonebridge Operating Co., LLC, No. 17 NO 0456, 2020 WL 
416290, at *8 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2020). 
 82. Id. at *10. 
 83. Fiocca v. AIM Energy, LLC, No. 19 CA 0930, 2019 WL 6713251, at *4 
(Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2019). 
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4. Implied Covenants 
Pavsek v. Wade dealt with the implied covenant of reasonable 
development and issues of notice to the lessee.88 When “a well is 
producing in paying quantities under the lease, in order for a lessor to 
assert that the failure to drill additional wells resulted in forfeiture for 
breach of the implied covenant of reasonable development, the lessor 
must have provided notice demanding further development to avoid 
forfeiture.”89 The notice is designed to provide, and must contain, “a 
reasonable time” for the lessee to conduct further development of the 
leasehold.90 And the lessor is not excused from providing the notice 
merely because a great deal of time has passed since the producing 
well was originally drilled.91 
 
 
 88. Pavsek v. Wade, 136 N.E.3d 1283, 1286–87, 1290, 1293 (Ohio App. 7th 
Dist. 2019). 
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